What social cognition covers
Social cognition is the umbrella term for how people perceive, interpret and respond to other people. When the SCOPE study looked for the best measures for schizophrenia research, its expert panel agreed on four core parts: emotion processing, social perception, theory of mind (also called mental state attribution) and attributional style, the habits people have when explaining why others act as they do (Pinkham et al., 2014).
Most tests target one part at a time, and a low score on one says little about the others.
Emotion recognition tests
An emotion recognition test shows a face, or part of one, and asks which emotion it shows. The classic version uses photographs of posed expressions of a few basic emotions: happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust and surprise. Ekman and Friesen (1971) found that people in a remote community in New Guinea matched such faces to stories much as Western participants did. Later tests added subtler emotions, voices and short clips.
Emotion recognition is one of the most studied abilities in autism research. A meta-analysis of 48 studies found that autistic groups recognized emotions less accurately on average, with an effect size of 0.80 that fell to 0.41 once a correction for publication bias was applied (Uljarević and Hamilton, 2013). That is a moderate difference between group averages, and the groups overlap a great deal.
Theory of mind tasks
Theory of mind is the ability to think about what someone else believes, wants or intends, especially when it differs from what you know. The best known measure is the false belief task. In the version by Wimmer and Perner (1983), a child hears a story in which a boy puts chocolate in one cupboard and goes out, and his mother moves it to another. Where will the boy look for it when he comes back? Answering well means setting aside what you know and taking his point of view.
The Sally and Anne test is the version most people have heard of. Sally puts a marble in her basket and leaves. Anne moves it to her box. Sally comes back: where will she look? Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985) acted it out with dolls and found that most of the autistic children in their study said the box, while most children with Down syndrome and most typically developing preschool children said the basket.
A meta-analysis of 178 studies found that children move from below chance to above chance on false belief tasks during the preschool years, across countries and task versions (Wellman et al., 2001). Adults nearly always pass a simple false belief story, so adult tests use stories about white lies, sarcasm or social blunders, and short films.
Where the eyes format fits
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes test sits between these two kinds. Simon Baron-Cohen and colleagues at Cambridge introduced it in 1997 as an advanced test of theory of mind for adults (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997). Each item is a black and white photograph of the eye region with four words for states such as doubtful, playful or preoccupied, and you choose the one that fits.
The revised version of 2001 has 36 photographs and a glossary for unfamiliar words. It separated 15 adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism from 239 adults without, and in both groups scores fell as self-rated autistic traits rose (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). It is now one of the most used adult measures of social cognition, and a Spanish version showed a one-year test-retest reliability of .63 in 358 adults (Fernández-Abascal et al., 2013).
What later research found
Three findings matter for anyone reading a score on the eyes format.
- Group differences are real and moderate. A meta-analysis of 18 studies found that autistic groups score lower on average than comparison groups, and that scores in comparison groups depend on verbal IQ and age (Peñuelas-Calvo et al., 2019). Many autistic adults score in the usual range and many non-autistic adults score low. The test was not built to diagnose anything, and it cannot.
- Alexithymia matters. Alexithymia is a reduced ability to identify and describe your own emotions. It often occurs alongside autism but is a separate trait (Bird and Cook, 2013). Oakley and colleagues compared autistic adults with a group matched for alexithymia: the two groups did not differ on the eyes test, alexithymia predicted the scores, and the autistic group still scored lower on a film-based theory of mind test (Oakley et al., 2016). They concluded that the eyes test may measure emotion recognition more than theory of mind.
- Vocabulary matters. A meta-analysis of 61 studies and more than 8,600 people found acceptable internal consistency, a stronger link with emotion perception than with other theory of mind measures, and a link with vocabulary (Kittel et al., 2022). Not knowing a word like aghast lowers a score without saying anything about reading people.
What these tests cannot tell you
Each of these tests uses a still image or a short story, without the movement, voice, context and back and forth of a real conversation. Scores move with vocabulary, the language of the test, how familiar the faces are, eyesight, the screen, tiredness and mood.
No single score shows whether someone is autistic, and a low score has many possible reasons. Clinicians who assess autism rely on a developmental history, interviews and observation; a task like these is at most one piece of the picture.
Trying one today
Reading the Eyes is an open version on this site, modelled on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes format. Every photograph and every word set is new, made for the site in English and Spanish. There are 40 photos with four words each, a meaning for every word one tap away, and no time limit; most people finish in about 7 minutes. At the end you see on how many photos you chose the intended word. There is no band or percentile yet: the comparison group is still being built.
The same task opens the autism traits check, which shows your count next to 42 statements about social situations, routines and the senses. On its own the task is one part of social understanding, not an autism test, and the check is a check, not a diagnosis.
Questions people ask
What is the difference between emotion recognition and theory of mind?
Emotion recognition is naming the feeling a face or a voice shows. Theory of mind is working out what someone believes or intends, including beliefs that differ from yours or from the facts. The two overlap, and some tests, such as the eyes format, draw on both.
Is there a theory of mind test for adults?
Yes. Adult tests use harder material than the stories children get: sarcasm, white lies, social blunders and short films. Most are used in research and clinics, next to other information.
Can an emotion recognition test diagnose autism?
No. Group differences on these tests are moderate, and the scores of autistic and non-autistic adults overlap widely. A diagnosis comes from a full assessment by a qualified clinician.
General information, not a diagnosis
This guide explains how emotion recognition and theory of mind are described and measured. It does not replace an assessment by a qualified clinician, and the sources it cites do not endorse Neuropsych.
References
- Baron-Cohen S, Jolliffe T, Mortimore C, Robertson M. Another advanced test of theory of mind: evidence from very high functioning adults with autism or Asperger syndrome. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry. 1997;38(7):813-822. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-7610.1997.tb01599.x
- Baron-Cohen S, Wheelwright S, Hill J, Raste Y, Plumb I. The “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test revised version: a study with normal adults, and adults with Asperger syndrome or high-functioning autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry. 2001;42(2):241-251. https://doi.org/10.1111/1469-7610.00715
- Oakley BFM, Brewer R, Bird G, Catmur C. Theory of mind is not theory of emotion: a cautionary note on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test. Journal of Abnormal Psychology. 2016;125(6):818-823. https://doi.org/10.1037/abn0000182
- Kittel AFD, Olderbak S, Wilhelm O. Sty in the mind's eye: a meta-analytic investigation of the nomological network and internal consistency of the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test. Assessment. 2022;29(5):872-895. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191121996469
- Peñuelas-Calvo I, Sareen A, Sevilla-Llewellyn-Jones J, Fernández-Berrocal P. The “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test in autism-spectrum disorders comparison with healthy controls: a systematic review and meta-analysis. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders. 2019;49(3):1048-1061. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-018-3814-4
- Wimmer H, Perner J. Beliefs about beliefs: representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception. Cognition. 1983;13(1):103-128. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(83)90004-5
- Baron-Cohen S, Leslie AM, Frith U. Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind”? Cognition. 1985;21(1):37-46. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(85)90022-8
- Wellman HM, Cross D, Watson J. Meta-analysis of theory-of-mind development: the truth about false belief. Child Development. 2001;72(3):655-684. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00304
- Ekman P, Friesen WV. Constants across cultures in the face and emotion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 1971;17(2):124-129. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0030377
- Uljarević M, Hamilton A. Recognition of emotions in autism: a formal meta-analysis. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders. 2013;43(7):1517-1526. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10803-012-1695-5
- Pinkham AE, Penn DL, Green MF, Buck B, Healey K, Harvey PD. The social cognition psychometric evaluation study: results of the expert survey and RAND panel. Schizophrenia Bulletin. 2014;40(4):813-823. https://doi.org/10.1093/schbul/sbt081
- Bird G, Cook R. Mixed emotions: the contribution of alexithymia to the emotional symptoms of autism. Translational Psychiatry. 2013;3(7):e285. https://doi.org/10.1038/tp.2013.61
- Fernández-Abascal EG, Cabello R, Fernández-Berrocal P, Baron-Cohen S. Test-retest reliability of the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” test: a one-year follow-up study. Molecular Autism. 2013;4:33. https://doi.org/10.1186/2040-2392-4-33